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al.: Right to Speedy
Trial
RIGHT TO A etSPEEDY
TRIAL

U.S. CONST.amend. Vk:

In all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy andpublic trial ....
N.Y. CoNST. art. II, § 12:

In all criminalprosecutions, the accused has a right to a speedy
andpublic trial ....

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Coplin'

(decided Feb. 18, 1997)
Defendant, Anthony Coplin, moved to dismiss his indictment
on the basis that the People of the state of New York failed to
give defendant a speedy trial under the Federal Constitution2 and
New York Constitution. Moreover, he alleged that the state
failed to respect his statutory right to a speedy trial under section
30.30 of New York's Criminal Procedure Law because the
prosecutor failed to exercise due diligence in searching for him."
654 N.Y.S.2d 150 (2d Dep't 1997).
CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
2 U.S.

public trial.. .. " Id.
3 N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 12. The provision states in pertinent part: "In all

criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to a speedy and public trial...
Id.
4 Coplin, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 150.

"

See N.Y. Cpat. PRoc. LAw § 30.30
(McKinney 1992). Section 30.30 provides for a speedy trial in the following
manner: In computing the time which the people must be ready for trial... the
following periods must be excluded:
The period of delay resulting from the absence or
unavailability of the defendant or, where the defendant is
absent or unavailable and has either escaped from custody or
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Defendant was indicted on November 3, 1993 and the district
attorney of Westchester County announced on that same day that
the state was ready to prosecute.5 After hearings, May 31, 1994,
was assigned as the day for defendant's trial.6 Shortly thereafter,
before the date his New York trial was to begin, defendant fled to
Roxbury, Massachusetts, and claimed it as his new residence. 7
When defendant did not appear for his trial in New York, the
judge issued an arrest warrant for defendant and ordered that his
bail be forfeited. 8 On February 9, 1996, defendant was arrested

for an unrelated crime in Massachusetts and was held in custody
in Boston, pursuant to the outstanding arrest warrant. 9
Subsequently, the defendant was returned to New York on April
15, 1996 after waiving extradition.'"
Defendant argued that the district attorney had defendant's
address, and did not use due diligence in apprehending him."

The Westchester County Court agreed,

2

reasoning that dismissal

was required when the People have defendant's address, which
gives rise to "an affirmative duty, even after they have
announced their readiness for trial, to search for the fugitive
has previously been released on bail or in his own
recognizance, the period extending from the day the court
issues a bench warrant pursuant to section 530.70 because of
defendant's failure to appear in court when required, to the
day the defendant subsequently appears in the court pursuant
to a bench warrant or voluntary or otherwise. A defendant
must be considered absent whenever his location is unknown
and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution, or
his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A
defendant must be considered unavailable whenever his
location is known but his presence for trial cannot be
obtained by due diligence.
Id.

5 Id.

6Id.
7 Id.at
8 Id.

150-51.
at 151

9Id.

Id.
1 Coplin, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
1o

12 Id.
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defendant, using such address as the starting point. " "
Accordingly, the county court held "that the People's failure to
prove their exercise of due diligence in fulfillment of this duty
warranted dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30." 4
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department
reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the matter for
further proceedings." The court explained that the county court's
reliance on the New York Court of Appeals case, People v.7
Bolden,' 6 was incorrect in that it did not apply to the facts at bar.
In Bolden, the defendant was accused of first degree robbery and
other related offenses."
He was released on his own
recognizance several days later.' 9 The defendant was indicted but
he did not appear at his arraignment, and a bench warrant was
issued for his arrest.2° 143 days after the bench warrant was
issued, the defendant returned to court. 2 "The People did not
declare their readiness on the record at any point during this
period."22 The defense counsel argued that the case should be
dismissed under section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law
because "there had been a total of 198 days unexcused days of
delay attributable to the People and that, consequently, the People
had failed to satisfy the statutory six-month readiness
requirement."2 Additionally, the defense argued that during this
period when defendant was absent, the People were in possession
Id. (citing People v. Bolden, 81 N.Y.2d 146, 613 N.E.2d 145, 597
N.Y.S.2d 270 (1993); People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529, 488 N.E.2d 1231,
13

498 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1985); People v. Roberts, 176 A.D.2d 1200, 576

N.Y.S.2d 698 (4th Dep't 1991)). See also People v. Davis, 205 A.D.2d 697,
613 N.Y.S.2d 668 (2d Dep't 1994); People v. Torres, 88 N.Y.2d 928, 669
N.E.2d 1112, 646 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1996).
14Id.

11 Id. at 150.
16 81 N.Y.2d 146, 613 N.E.2d 145, 597 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1993).
17 Coplin, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
IsBolden, 81 N.Y.2d at 148, 613 N.E.2d at 146, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
191d.
20Id.
21

Id.

22

Id. at 149, 613 N.E.2d at 146, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 271.

23 Id.
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of defendant's address, and could have apprehended him had the
state exercised due diligence.2 The Court of Appeals stated:
CPL 30.30 (4) (c) excludes certain periods during
which the defendant is 'absent' or 'unavailable'
from the time in which People must otherwise
become ready for trial. In 1984, the Legislature
amended that paragraph to expand the scope of its
exclusion (L 1984,ch 670). The issue in this appeal
is whether the previously existing requirement that
the People must exercise 'due diligence' in locating
an 'absent' defendant or obtaining an 'unavailable
defendant's presence applies to cases arising under
the amendment. We hold that, far from exempting
such cases the 'due diligence' requirement, the
amendment
expressly
incorporates
it.
Accordingly, the People cannot obtain the benefit
of the exclusion in these circumstances without
satisfactorily demonstrating their compliance with
that precondition?
The Second Department distinguished Bolden from the instant
matter, explaining that the prosecution in Bolden did not
announce the state's readiness for trial at any point during the
period of defendant's absence. However, in Coplin, the state
announced its readiness for trial, and the Coplin court concluded
that the due diligence requirement of CPL 30.30(4)(c) is not
applicable when the People have announced their readiness for
trial and the defendant subsequently flees. 27 "[T]his court has
consistently stated that the due diligence requirement of CPL
30.30 (4) (c) does not apply in the case of a defendant who flees
after the People have announced their readiness for trial." 28
24

Id.

2

Id.

I People v. Coplin, 654 N.Y.S.2d 150, 150-51 (2d Dep't 1997).
27 Id.

' Id. (citing People v. Williams, 229 A.D.2d 603, 603, 646 N.Y.S.2d 142,
143 (2d Dep't 1996)) (stating "Once the People have announced their
readiness for trial, there is no requirement that they exercise due diligence to

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/50

4

et al.: Right to Speedy Trial

1998

RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

1159

Thus, the courts of New York make a crucial distinction between
a case that involves a "pre-readiness" delay, when the state did
not declare its readiness for trial at any time during the relevant
period, and a "post-readiness" delay when the state has already
announced its readiness for trial.29
In determining whether or not a defendant has received a
speedy trial in compliance with his or her constitutional rights,
the Second Department explains that it depends on whether or not
there is a post-readiness or pre-readiness delay.3 If the state has
announced its readiness for trial and a delay or absence occurs
that is attributable to defendant then due diligence is not required
by the state.

locate the defendant when he has voluntarily absented himself from the
proceedings, since the People did not contribute to the delays."); People v.
Cropper 202 A.D.2d 603, 605, 609 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (2d Dep't 1994)
(holding that a defendant was not denied his constitutional right to speedy trial
because the eleven year disappearance was attributable to the defendant, and
occurred after the people announced their readiness for trial). See also People
v. Cephas, 207 A.D.2d 903, 616 N.Y.S.2d 668 (2d Dep't 1994); People v.
Myers, 171 A.D.2d 148, 575 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't 1991); People v.
Lopez, 170 Misc. 2d 278, 648 N.Y.S.2d 231 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings
County 1996).
29Id.

30

Coplin, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
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